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The Right to Treatment-Alternative Rationales
INTRODUCTION

That which is most clear in any debate over proper care for the
mentally ill is the need for an immediate solution. Understaffed and
poorly maintained hospitals with doctor-patient ratios as high as one
to 950 are no less than a national shame.' To ask where the blame lies
2
is a waste of time. The important concern is what must be done.
Legislative action in the form of a right to treatment law has long
been looked to as a cure. Numerous writers have advocated this position
in the belief that objective standards of administration and fair treatment will cure the present situation. 3 The problems that beset the passage of such legislation are legion. Foremost among them are the

allocation o resources and lo

v

RBth

of

the

have

been dis-

cussed in other parts of this symposium. 4 The major question clouding
the promise of a legislative solution is: What is the validity of a right to
treatment statute if a constitutional right to treatment is recognized by
the judiciary? Wyatt v. Stickney5 recognized a constitutional right to
treatment, and it is submitted that other courts will eventually follow
its lead. When they do, the iron mold of a statutory remedy will have
1. Hearings on the Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 41
(1970). See generally Birnbaum, A Rationale For The Right, 57 GEO. L.J. 752 (1969).
2. Birnbaum, Some Remarks On "The Right to Treatment," 23 ALA. L. REv. 623, 628
(1971).
3. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 1.
4. See Debate, The Right to Treatment-Encounterand Synthesis, 10 Duq. L. REv. 554
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Debate]; Comment, The Right to Treatment-JudicialRealism
and Judicial Initiative, 10 Duq. L. REv. 609 (1972). It has been said:
The failure of this field to get its due legal attention can be primarily explained by
the absence of a moving power behind it. Unfortunately, the "insanity" field was deprived of its most powerful lobby through a process of human erosion, in institutions
where cure was the exception rather than the rule. With the voice of the mentally ill
themselves muted and their families either too willing to be relieved of the burden
of care, or too poor, or too eager to conceal the family "stigma," appeals to legislature,
the courts and the legal profession were rather few. This legal situation, however,
appears to have been part and parcel of a general pattern of neglect in everything
connected with mental illness.
Kittrie, Compulsory Mental Treatment and the Requirements of "Due Process," 21 OHIo
ST. L.J. 28, 29 (1960). See also Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 763 for the proposition that a
massive effort by the Pennsylvania AFL-CIO was responsible for legislation being drafted
which led to Pennsylvania's proposed "Right to Treatment Law of 1968." This bill died
when the Pennsylvania General Assembly failed to enact the statute. For the text of this
proposed bill and a discussion of it by its drafters see Furman and Conners, The Pennsylvania Experiment in Due Process, 8 DuQ. L. REv. 32 (1969). For a discussion of this
bill's future see the comments of Mrs. Mary Baltimore in the Debate at 578.
5. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
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been a fruitless endeavor. Constitutional rights simply do not lend
themselves to rigid statutory control.
This is not to say that a statutory right to treatment is of no value;
if properly administered it offers some hope for the mentally ill. It is
our contention, however, that it is far from being a complete solution,
and in light of Wyatt, it may very well be one which does not respond to the full rights of the mentally ill. Therefore, it is up to the
judiciary to provide the initiative if proper treatment is to become a
reality.6
Our purpose in this article is to present alternative rationales for a
constitutional right to treatment by tracing the development of the law
in the right to counsel and education areas. 7 Since Wyatt, such an
undertaking is open to the criticism of no longer being necessary. Wyatt,
however, makes it more necessary for two reasons. First, the issue of a
constitutional right to treatment was not litigated. Before the trial the
defendants agreed there was or should be a constitutional right to
treatment. Therefore, the recognition of this right did not result from
the adversarial process. 8 The opinion simply expresses the joint conclusion of the parties; a conclusion that may not be reached prior to trial in
another state when the issue again arises. Second, the opinion is based
on the moral argument that the state has no justification to take one's
freedom without supplying proper treatment. This argument has been
advocated with little success for many years.9 Specifically, the court said:
When patients are so committed for treatment purposes they unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual
treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be
cured or to improve his or her mental condition ....

Adequate

and effective treatment is constitutionally required because, absent
treatment, the hospital is transformed "into a penitentiary where
one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense."
...The purpose of involuntary hospitalization for treatment purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment. This
is the only justification, from a constitutional standpoint, that
allows civil commitments to mental institutions .... 10
6. Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 765.
7. It is recognized that because a constitutional right to treatment has no dear history
in our common law that it is more readily established by argument than by precedent.
Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53"VA. L. Ray. 1134, 1147 (1967).
8. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment-Some Comments on Implementation, 10 DuQ.
L. REv. 579 (1972).
9. It was first proposed by Dr. Morton Birnbaum in 1960. Birnbaum, The Right to
Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 516 (1960).
10. 325 F. Supp. at 784 (citations omitted).
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No one can morally reject this language but the key word here is
1 and Covington v.
morally. The court relied on Rouse v. Cameron"
2
Harris1 as authority. These cases dealt with a statutory right to treatment and never reached the constitutional issue. Therefore, the opinion
is weak authority. It is with this in mind that we analyze other areas
of the law to support the existing arguments.
The two areas we have chosen are right to counsel and education.
Right to counsel is guaranteed by the Constitution and has developed
through due process. Right to education is relatively new and its advancement has been through equal protection. Clearly, they are different in these respects but when analyzed in reference to a common
model they show a parallel development which must be followed in
the mental health area. The model consists of three parts. The first is
recognition of a fundamental personal interest.
Fundamental personal interests are interests or rights of important
personal concern such as procreation, 3 divorce,' 4 and rights with respect to criminal procedure.'5 The Supreme Court in protecting fundamental interests has relied on either equal protection or due process,
and in some instances on a combination of both. In Skinner v. Oklahoma 6 ex rel. Williamson, equal protection was used to invalidate a
state statute which provided for the sterilization of certain classes of
habitual criminals. The Court said that procreation was an interest
fundamental to the individual, and after a "strict scrutiny" of the
sterilization statute concluded that no compelling reason existed to
justify the classification. 17 The ability to obtain a divorce was protected
in Boddie v. Connecticut,8 where the Court held that it was a denial
of due process to preclude indigents because of their inability to pay
filing fees from dissolving a marriage.' 9 In Griffin v. Illinois" and
Anders v. California2' the Court did not differentiate between equal
11. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
12. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
13. Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
14. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
15. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
16. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
17. Id. at 541. For a detailed discussion on fundamental personal interests in equal
protection see Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1120-23,
1127-31 (1969).
18. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
19. Id. at 374-76. See The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 H~av. L. R.Ev. 3, 108-110
(1971) for a discussion on Boddie in reference to access to the courts as an equal protection
fundamental interest. For a discussion on due process fundamental interests see Ratner,
The Function of the Due Process Clause, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 1048 (1968).
20. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
21. 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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protection and due process in protecting the accused's fundamental
interest in a fair criminal process. 22 In Griffin, where the Court held
that indigent defendants could not be denied appellate review because
of their inability to buy transcripts, the entwining of the two clauses
can be seen in the statement that the "Due Process or Equal Protection
Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious discrimination. ' 23 Anders also provides a striking example of this fusion. Holding
that a court appointed appellate counsel's decision not to prosecute a
first appeal from a criminal conviction of an indigent violated the
Constitution, the Court said "California's action does not comport
with fair procedure and lacks that equality that is required by the
24
Fourteenth Amendment."
Although a greater scope of review, when fundamental personal
interests are at stake, has come under equal protection rather than due
process, 25 it must be noted that the Court's desire to protect the fundamental interests involved is common to both areas.2 6 Therefore, an
analysis of a problem where an infringement of a fundamental interest
is involved need not be pigeon-holed in either equal protection or due
27

process.

Recognition of a fundamental interest and its further development
into a right is the initial step in the development of legal duties toward
that right. In the right to counsel area recognition of a fundamental
interest and development into an effective right is relatively easy to
grasp. The interest is that of liberty, a fair trial, and an effective opportunity to defend criminal charges. In education the interest is more
sophisticated than liberty; in the face of compulsory school programs
it also has its source in state concern. The interest is in producing
responsible citizens for society and to afford each member an opportunity to live a useful life. The fundamental interest of the mentally ill
patient is also that of liberty. However, it includes the concept of treatment as it is only with effective treatment that he will be able to enjoy
liberty in the true sense of the word.
22. See Comment, Trumpets in the Corridors of Bureaucracy: A Coming Right to Appointed Counsel in Administration Adjudicative Proceedings, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 758,
781-783 (1971).
23. 351 U.S. at 18.
24. 386 U.S. at 741.
25. Developments, supra note 17 at 1131-32.
26. See Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, Forward: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARv. L. REv. 7, 25 (1969).
27. See Goodpaster, The Integration of Equal Protection, Due Process Standards, and
the Indigent's Right of Free Access to the Courts, 56 IowA L. REv. 223 (1970).
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The second part of our proposed model of analysis is the concept of
involuntariness or compulsion present in the form of state action. Once
again in right to counsel this concept is quickly identifiable-the state's
deprivation of freedom under its police power. Compulsory attendance
laws illustrate this aspect in education. In mental health involuntariness
is present when the patient is involuntarily civilly committed.2
The third part of the model is the definition of state duties when
involuntariness through state action acts upon the fundamental personal interest. Whether the response is based on due process or equal
protection is not important. What is crucial is the judicial recognition
that the state has an affirmative duty to protect the fundamental interest.
Right to counsel and education demonstrate the model at different
29
stages of development. Right to counsel, since Powell v. Alabama,
has steadily developed to a point where one can safely say it is an integral part of the concept of justice in today's society. Review of its
development, despite its presence in the Bill of Rights, amply demonstrates that before Powell it was an empty right. The right to education
is a relatively new concept. Its stage of development might be termed
embryonic, but it still commands a position much higher in terms of
recognition than mental health. For this reason we have selected education to test the pattern of development which the model reflects has
been followed in the right to counsel area.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

This argument will deal with the due process clause and its possible
application in giving an involuntarily civilly committed patient relief.
The arguments themselves are based upon the development of due
process in the area of right to counsel. The first recognition of an effective right to counsel came in Powell. In order to understand its
28. It is submitted this does not mean that the principles calling for the recognition
of a right to treatment apply only to the involuntarily civilly committed. Involuntariness
can also be accomplished by passive state action. If one looks at the problem of housing
this is readily seen. Clearly it is not the state itself that promotes separation of the races
in neighborhoods. But even if the state does nothing it is passively allowing society to do
it themselves. The state does not offer alternative ways to create the proper balance. In
mental health the same phenomenon is present in the voluntary form of commitment.
Inherent in voluntariness is the notion of choice-viable alternatives. State inaction has
resulted in a minimum of alternatives available to one who must face the problem. A
clear example can be seen with those who may loosely be termed senile psychotics. The
senile psychotic label is attached to older people so that the state mental hospital can be
used as an old folks home. Passive state action in not presenting alternatives makes the
voluntary commitment no less an involuntary withdrawal from society.
29. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
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significance, however, a brief development of the history of due process
is necessary.
Development of Due Process
As early as 1855 the Supreme Court, while not defining the words
"due process of law," did say that the term was intended to have the
same meaning as the words "by the law of the land" found in the
Magna Carta.3 0 In England at the time of the Magna Carta this phrase
was used to substitute law for kingly force. The law substituted was
feudal law, and as the feudal system disappeared "there was no reason
why the meaning of 'freemen,' 'peers,' and 'law of the land' should
not be extended and it was." 3 ' In 1354 King Edward III promised in
the "Statute of Westminster of the Liberties of London" that "no man
of what estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of Land or
Tenement, nor taken, nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to
Death, without being brought to Answer by due process of the Law."'3 2
However, due process was never extended to apply to the control of
legislation, and received practically no judicial construction in English
33
case law.

On the other hand, due process has been applied in an ever increasing variety of situations in the United States. Originally, it was thought
to encompass only procedural matters. 34 In 1884 the Court in dictum
extended its meaning to include matters of substantive law. 35 This extension was followed in 1890 when the Court formally freed due process
from its procedural mold. 36 The new applications of the due process

guarantee were flexible enough to allow the courts to look to the inherent elements of justice in any determination of right.37 While all
30. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97 (1878); Murray v. Hoboken L. & I. Co., 59 U.S.
(18 How.) 272 (1855). For the early development of due process of law, see Hough, Due
Process of Law-Today, 32 HARv. L. REv. 218 (1918).
31. Willis, Due Process of Law Under the United States Constitution, 74 U. PA. L. REV.
331, 333 (1925).
32. Statute of 28 Edward III.
33. Willis, supra note 31, at 334.
34. Murray v. Hoboken L. & I. Co., 59 US. (18 How.) 272 (1855); Bank of Columbia
v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235 (1819).
35. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884). The Court in dictum said that the
concessions of the Magna Carta "applied in England only as guards against executive
usurpation and tyranny, here they have become bulwarks also against arbitrary legislation;
but, in that application, as it would be incongruous to measure and restrict them by the
ancient customary English law, they must be held to guarantee not particular forms of
procedure, but the very substance of individual rights to life, liberty, and property." Id. at
532.
36. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890).
37. Kittrie, supra note 4, at 45.
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scholars did not agree that the Supreme Court should have extended
38
due process to include matters of substantive law, extend it they did.
The Court's function was to balance the individual's interests, as expressed in the general terms of life, liberty, and property, against the
claims of society and state. It has been said:
The work of examining, valuing and balancing all these varied
and conflicting claims cannot be based on logical deduction from
abstract legal principles, but rather will find its dynamics in economics, sociology, and philosophy. The task will be accomplished
not by a tired-eyed scrutiny of the words of the Constitution, but
by an examination of the concrete interests involved in each case,
and by the individual views of the justices as to their validity and
importance.3 9
Due process was at this stage of development and understanding when
the Supreme Court made its momentous decision in Powell.
Powell v. Alabama and Due Process
In Powell seven Negro youths were arraigned, tried, convicted, and
sentenced to death for rape twelve days after their arrest-without
having the benefit of "counsel in any real sense." The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the denial of effective counsel-the customary
incidents of consultation and opportunity to prepare for the trialviolated fourteenth amendment due process.
With this decision the Court demonstrated its willingness to apply
due process concepts, even though such application was in keeping with
sociological and philosophical aspects of society rather than strict legal
rules. The Court declared, "the failure of the trial court to make an
effective appointment of counsel was likewise a denial of due process
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment." 40 This violated
a firmly established, long-standing rule-that constitutional questions,
even when properly raised and argued, are to be decided only when
necessary for a determination of the rights of the parties in controversy
41
before it.
The Court could have complied with this rule by relying

on Moore v. Dempsey,42 or by holding that on the facts as alleged and
38. Willis, supra note 31, at 344.
39. Brown, Due Process, Police Power, and the Supreme Court, 40 HARV. L. Ray. 943,
966-67 (1927).
40. 287 U.S. at 71.
41. Id. at 77 (Butler, J. dissenting).
42. 261 U.S. 86 (1923). In this case five Negroes were sentenced to death on conviction
for murder. The petition to the federal court alleged mob domination and the denial of
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proved the Alabama trial court denied due process by failing to give
the defendants reasonable time and opportunity to secure counsel.
This extension of due process was unnecessary. Therefore, the question is-what impelled the Court to abandon their established mode
of procedure? If, as has been suggested, case law resembles a patch-work
quilt,43 the Court must have found a gaping hole which they chose to
plug by means of the due process clause. Apparently, this was the
utilization of due process to meet the demands of the time. The Court
in 1932 recognized their responsibility to weigh the individual's interests against the claims of society and the state. Further, they were not
deterred by constitutional rules from arriving at a result that had to
be made.
The expansion of due process can be clearly understood by reference
to the basic model proposed in the introduction. The Court was concerned with a fundamental interest-individual freedom. The concept
of involuntariness is seen in the deprivation of that freedom. Therefore, we see the interaction of these concepts in terms of state action
impinging upon the fundamental interest. When these two concepts
come together there must be an extension of guarantees by the state
in order to protect the fundamental interest. The right to counsel is
present in the Constitution. The extension through due process of the
right to effective counsel, however, can only be understood as a response
to the state's prosecutorial thrusts. If the Court in 1932 was willing to
span the gaps of the patch-work quilt by utilizing due process, it is submitted that it is incumbent on today's Court to take the same pervasive
look at society and plug the gaps which deny justice to the mentally ill.
In 1932 the Court recognized that the right to effective counsel was
constitutionally required to protect the liberty of seven Negro youths.
If a person is involuntarily committed to a state mental institution,
without a right to effective treatment, his liberty is similarly. offended.
He needs the protection of the Constitution just as much as the accused
in Powell. Nevertheless, this is no more than a nice theoretical proposition unless the Court is willing to face and decide affirmatively the issue
a fair trial. The Supreme Court of Arkansas had denied all exceptions to the rulings of
the trial court. The Supreme Court of the United States held that if it were shown
the trial was dominated by a mob, and the state courts failed to correct this wrong, perfection in the state machinery for correction would not prevent them from securing to the
petitioners their constitutional rights. For a discussion of the similarity between Powell
and Moore see 23 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 841 (1933).
43. This view of case law is suggested by Hough, supra note 30, at 224.
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of the existence of a constitutional right to treatment. The Court has
44
refused to do so in the past.

Before 1971 several mental patients sought judicial recognition of the
right to adequate treatment. One district court had the opportunity
to wrestle with the constitutional problems touching upon the rights
of those committed to a mental institution-but chose not to deal with
these issues.4

5

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of

Columbia, when faced with the narrow issue of applying a statute to
find a statutory right to treatment, did not find it necessary to expand
their holding to include a constitutional right to treatment.46 The spirit
of the Powell Court in 1932 to willingly go beyond the factual situation
before them in order to serve an overall needed goal was not present.
One dissenting justice wished to limit the issue before the court to
whether the appellant was in need of treatment. This view of the case
would have mooted the issue of a statutory right to treatment as wella judicial attitude inconsistent with that necessary to establish a constitutional right to treatment. 47 This attitude is also prevalent among state
courts; only one court having alluded that an involuntarily committed
patient has a constitutional right to treatment.4 8 In Wyatt v. Stickney,
44. The most interesting examples of the Court's refusal to hear this issue can be seen
in the Donaldson decisions; Donaldson v. O'Connor, 400 U.S. 869 (1970); Donaldson v.
O'Connor, 390 U.S. 971 (1968); Donaldson v. Florida, 371 U.S. 806 (1963); In re Donaldson,
364 U.S. 808 (1960). In all of these cases certiorari was denied. See Birnbaum, supra note 1,
at 774.
45. Maurietta v. Ciccone, 305 F. Supp. 775 (W.D. Mo. 1969), was a proceeding on a
habeas corpus petition by an unconvicted inmate of a medical center for federal prisoners.
The court said the petition raised constitutional questions based on numerous authorities.
However, they ducked these questions by saying: "Because it is possible, we decide this
case without reaching the many grave constitutional questions which might be presented
by an application of the principles articulated in the authorities noted in the last paragraph." Id. at 778.
46. Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). The court stated: "Because we
hold that the right to treatment provision applies to appellant, we need not resolve the
serious constitutional questions that Congress avoided by prescribing this right." Id. at 455.
This position was repeated by Chief Justice Bazelon in Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
47. Circuit Judge Danaher, dissenting in Rouse v. Cameron, saw the issue before the
court as not whether Rouse had a statutory right to treatment but whether Rouse needed
treatment. 373 F.2d at 462. While this is in keeping with looking at a case in light of the
narrowest constitutional principles possible, it does not advance the spirit necessary to
utilize the due process clause as a bridge to provide involuntarily committed persons with
effective treatment. As well, it ignores the involuntariness which has impinged the fundamental interest of effective treatment for the mentally ill.
48. In Nason v. Superintendent of Bridgewater State Hospital, 353 Mass. 604, 233 N.E.2d
908 (1968), Nason, having been indicted for murder, was committed to Bridgewater State
Hospital because he was mentally incompetent to stand trial. He challenged this commitment on a writ of habeas corpus. He argued that because the medical standards at Bridge.
water were substantially lower than at other state hospitals he was being deprived of equal
protection of the laws, and his confinement without treatment deprived him of due process
of law. In discussing the issue of a right to treatment, the court said, "We merely determine that, if adequate treatment for Nason is not provided there within a reasonable
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however, a federal district court unequivocally recognized a constitu49
tional right to treatment.
In Wyatt the guardians of patients confined in a state mental hospital brought a class action alleging that the treatment programs at
the hospital were scientifically and medically inadequate, thereby depriving patients of their constitutional rights. The court, in an order
written by Chief Judge Johnson, held that state mental institutions are
constitutionally required to provide adequate medical treatment for
civilly committed patients. In arriving at this conclusion the court permitted the defendants" six months "to promulgate and implement
proper standards for the adequate mental care of the patients" in the
state hospital. This allowed the defendants a reasonable time to implement the new mental health measures5 ' which had already been undertaken.
53
The court relied on Rouse v. Cameron52 and Covington v. Harris
in recognizing a constitutional right to treatment. Reliance on these
two cases (both having dealt with a statutory right) is subject to the
attack that the court could have looked to a statutory remedy and not
have gone as far as they did. Therefore, the decision can be read for
the proposition that if a state possesses a statutory right to treatment
there is no necessity to establish a constitutional right.
It is just as plausible to give another reading to Wyatt which is more
in keeping with its general spirit. The court, when talking about patime, the legality of his further confinement may be presented to the county court." Id. at
613, 233 N.E.2d at 914. Because Nason had, by statute, the right to receive treatment the
court may have been alluding to a constitutional right.
49. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
50. The defendants were the commissioners and the deputy commissioner of the Department of Mental Health of the State of Alabama, the members of the Alabama Mental
Health Board, the Governor of the State of Alabama, and the probate judge of Montgomery County, Alabama, as representative of the other judges of probate in the State of
Alabama. Id. at 782.
51. The Alabama Department of Mental Health had for two and one half years been
engaged in a transition from a departmental system organization to the unit-team system
of delivery of mental health services and treatment to patients. The unit-team system
would divide Alabama into contiguous geographical county units. Each unit would be led
by a team leader who would normally be a professional. It was proposed that each unit
contain such professionals as physicians, psychologists, and social workers, as well as psychiatric aids and nurses. The patients within the unit were to receive individual attention
according to their needs. Id. at 783.
An interim order was filed March 2, 1972, referring to the massive reform needed. It
specifically dealt with the operation of Partlow State School and Hospital which the court
referred to as a warehousing institution because of its atmosphere of psychological and
physical deprivation. Among the specific remedies ordered was the immediate employment
of 300 persons. A final order was entered as this article went to press on April 13, 1972,
see Birnbaum, supra note 8, at n.77.
52. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
53. 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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tients who were involuntarily committed through noncriminal procedures without the constitutional protections that are afforded defendants in criminal proceedings, stated:
When patients are so committed for treatment purposes they unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual
treatment as will give each of them a realistic opportunity to be
cured or to improve his or her mental condition. .

.

.Adequate

and effective treatment is constitutionally required because, absent
treatment, the hospital is transformed "into a penitentiary where
one could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense. 5 4
It is submitted the correct reading of Wyatt is that even when a statutory right to treatment is present there is still a constitutional right to
adequate treatment. When a patient is not receiving the individual treatment that would give him a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental condition, this constitutional right is being violated
irrespective of any statutory guarantees made to the patient. Such a
reading is not unprecedented. The court simply utilized due process
to plug the gap found in the patch-work quilt of case law. This reading
of Wyatt is closely analogous to the spirit of the Supreme Court displayed in Powell. As such it is a judicial response to the needs of the
time, not an opinion based on unfounded precedent.
Protection of the Fundamental Interest-Expansionof the State's Duty

The logical attack to the use of the extension of right to counsel to
justify the recognition of a constitutional right to treatment is simply
that one is talking of apples and oranges at the same time. Procedural
rights are not substantive rights and therefore the argument must fail.
Although no amount of rhetoric can conclusively bridge the gap, it is
submitted that the basic model we have chosen to analyze the two areas
eliminates the need to do so. We started with the premise that what we
have in the two areas is a fundamental interest. Our concern is what the
response of the state must be when it imposes upon this interest by involuntarily taking the individual's liberty. The concern is what the response must be, not the form of that response. The differences in the
goals sought by state action dictate a difference in the protection which
is needed. Therefore, that the response in one is procedural while the
other is substantive does not mean we are confusing apples and oranges.
54.
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It is the realization that the state possesses certain duties that is the common bond between the two areas.
Procedural rights for the criminally accused have been greatly expanded in order to define the state's duty toward the fundamental interest of human liberty. After Powell the Court extended the guarantee
of counsel to all indigent criminal defendants in federal courts. 55 Although in 1942 the Court retrenched,5 6 in 196357 they held that the indigent criminal defendant, whether in a state or federal court, was constitutionally guaranteed the right to be provided with counsel. However,
this was not the end of procedural protection which the Supreme Court
felt were guaranteed by the due process clause. Procedural guarantees
were expanded and reached their highest degree of development in a juvenile case in 1967. In In re Gault5 every aspect of juvenile court jurisdiction was weighed against the rights of a juvenile under due process.
Due process guarantees were found to apply to notice, right to counsel,
right to confrontation and cross-examination, right to a transcript of the
proceedings, right to appellate review, and the privilege against self59
incrimination.
Similarities Between Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings
and Involuntary Civil Commitments
Certain patent similarities exist between juvenile delinquency proceedings and involuntary civil commitment processes. The state action
in both can be prompted by the same rationale-parens patriae. 60 It is
55. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
56. In Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), the Court held that an absolute right to
counsel in non-capital cases was only necessary under special circumstances and was not
fundamental to due process in state courts. The "totality of facts" in a given case was to
be the test for a denial of due process.
57. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
58. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
59. Id. at 10.
60. The doctrine of parens patriae has long been the rationale behind juvenile court
proceedings. Under parens patriae the court intervenes when there is danger to the health
and welfare of the child because of a lack of parental attention. See generally Lipsitt, Due
Process as a Gateway to Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 49 B.U. L. REv. 62
(1969); Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARv. L. Ray. 104 (1909).
Compulsory commitments are generally made under two rationales: commitment because
a person is dangerous to others, i.e., the state's police power is exercised, or commitment
because the patient is dangerous to himself, i.e., the state as parens patriae. Frequently,
these have been combined. See generally Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill:
Theories and Procedures,79 H.av. L. REv. 1288 (1966). For purposes of the present analogy
we are speaking of the state in its parens patriae role. However, the analogy also serves
for commitments under the state police power. Even if it were truly possible to isolate
those persons who really constitute a danger to others with some degree of certainty the
end result is the same-deprivation of freedom and impingement of the fundamental
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submitted that the following description of the mutual compact between the state and the delinquent child applies equally as well to the
relationship between the involuntarily committed patient and the state.
The child [patient] agrees to relinquish certain constitutional safeguards and to allow intervention into the family institution in exchange for the court's promise "to employ the best institutional,
probationary, medical, psychiatric and other techniques in providing an opportunity for each child [patient] to develop into a mature
[functional] and law-abiding citizen." 61
This is the same guarantee the involuntarily committed patient wants.
State action has affected his fundamental interests and in return he
wants treatment. Unfortunately, the state has not been upholding its
part of the bargain. 62 The course which must be followed by the judiciary has been partly chartered for them in Gault.
In Gault the Court found that parens patriae proved to be a great
help in rationalizing the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional
scheme; further the Court said its meaning is murky and its historic
credentials of dubious relevance.6 It is submitted that involuntary civil
commitments made under the strength of the state's role as parens
patriae-when not followed by a right to treatment-can no more be
justified than the delinquency proceedings found so defective in Gault.
When the Supreme Court said "Juvenile Court history has again demonstrated that unbridled discretion, however benevolently motivated,
is frequently a poor substitute for principal and procedure"6 they could
have just as accurately been speaking of the history of involuntary civil
commitments.6" Outrageous doctor-patient ratios66 are one indication
that the involuntarily committed patient is not getting real help. This
interest through involuntary commitment. Also we see in the criminal law area that concomitant with imprisonment is rehabilitation. Therefore the duties which must flow from
the state are the same no matter which rationale for commitment is used. For a discussion
of the difficulty in determining when one does present a real danger, see Livermore, Maimquist and Meehl, On the Justification for Civil Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75 (1968).
61. This quote which appears in Lipsitt, supra note 60, at 71, combines the author's
language with that of Judge Ketchum which appears in Ketchum, The Unfulfilled Promise
of the Juvenile Court, 7 Cram. & DELIN. 97 (1961).
62. Birnbaum, supra note 2, at 631-32.
63. 387 U.S. at 16.
64. Id. at 18.
65. It might be argued that decisions such as Dixon v. Attorney General of Pennsylvania, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971) are giving these procedural rights to the mentally
ill and therefore further use of Gault as an analogy is unwarranted. However, Dixon,
which declared two doctor involuntary commitments to be unconstitutional, does not
affect the analogy. Even if every procedural guarantee possible were given to the mentally
ill the problem of inadequate treatment would still be present. Once committed, the patient has no alternative but what is provided for him by the state.
66. Birnbaum, supra note 1, at 779-81.
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much is clear, to cure these ills judicial action is necessary. The action
needed is not the same procedural due process guarantees made in
Gault, but the recognition of a constitutional right to treatment.
Only by this recognition can the fundamental interests involved be
fully protected. A decision clearly declaring that there is a right to treat,
ment is a step just as fittingly within a court's decision-making capabilities as was the granting of the procedural guarantees to the juvenile
through Gault. Courts should not be impeded by any feeling that due
process can be extended to procedural rights easier than it can to substantive rights. Any timidity based on such a rationale would be unfounded. The time has long since passed when due process was thought
to apply only to procedural rights.67 That courts must extend themselves
and decide there is a constitutional right to treatment is supported by
practicality, reality, common sense and-since Wyatt-precedent.
It has been suggested that Gault provided the right to counsel and
other procedural safeguards to the juvenile because of the nature of the
treatment received after a judicial determination of delinquency has
been made. 68 The theory is that the treatment a youth receives after
being found a juvenile delinquent is so suspect that procedural guarantees are necessary to protect him from an unfounded exposure to this
treatment. The same guarantees have not generally been given to the
involuntarily committed patient. Even if they had, their effect would
be minimal. The involuntarily committed patient, influenced by the
"institutionalizing" effect of confinement would probably "choose" to
remain in the institution. 69 Even though the evils of inadequate treatment are similar, the differences in the purposes to be served by state
action call for the affording of different remedies.
The Court in Gault recognized that some type of shield was necessary
if the fundamental personal interest of liberty was to be protected.
Their response was to put an affirmative duty on the state to afford
certain procedural guarantees to the juvenile. The remedy to the problem was procedural and they did not attempt to deal with inadequate
treatment. In the mental health area, however, they must. Liberty is
67. Willis, supra note 31, at 343-44.
68. Lipsitt, supra note 60, at 71.
69. This line of reasoning has been verified by the aftermath of Dixon v. Attorney
General of Pennsylvania, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971). The state undertook the task
of recommitting all the patients previously committed under an unconstitutional procedure. Even though they were now offered additional procedural guarantees, roughly 88%
voluntarily remained in the state hospitals. Letter from Ralph J. Phelleps, Special Assistant

for Service to Offenders, Office of Mental Health, Department of Public Welfare to the
Duquesne Law Review, Dec. 15, 1971.
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similarly offended by state action and commitment without treatment
is both "shocking and scandalous." 70 A procedural guarantee does not
go to heart of the problem. There is even more at stake when dealing
with a mental health patient. A juvenile is only confined as a delinquent
until he reaches his majority. A mental health patient without proper
treatment may be confined for life. Every conceivable procedural guarantee will not give this patient proper treatment. Furthermore, all
juvenile delinquent suspects are before the court for an alleged wrong,
while those patients committed under the state's banner of parens
patriae are guilty only of unaccepted behavior. It is grossly unjust to
lock these patients away without some guarantee of effective treatment.
The juvenile who was suspected of some wrong-doing is given procedural guarantees. This involuntarily civilly committed patient who is
guilty of not conforming to society must be given the constitutional
right to adequate treatment.
EDUCATION

By compelling children to go to school the state has acted to develop
and protect a fundamental person interest--education. In order to do
so the state has taken away the child's liberty, and in return the state
has certain affirmative duties. Similarly, treatment for the mentally ill
should be recognized as a fundamental personal interest and therefore,
when someone is involuntarily civilly committed to a state institution
he should be entitled to adequate treatment in return for his loss of
liberty. The state's activity of involuntarily taking the individual to
protect and develop a fundamental personal interest gives rise to the
71
state's duty to the individual.
The education cases are generally based on equal protection. Too
strict an adherence to equal protection, however, is misleading. In
Harperv. Virginia Board of Elections,72 the Court held that a classification based on wealth could not bar the exercise of voting rights. It
has been suggested that the Court's decision was based on protecting
the right to vote rather than eradicating the inequalities of the wealth
classification. 78 The basic principle here has been labeled "minimum
70. Twerski, Treating the Untreatable-A Critique of the Proposed Pennsylvania Right
to Treatment Law, 9 DuQ. L. REv. 220 (1970).

71. Cf. Bendich, Privacy, Poverty, and the Constitution, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 407, 420
(1966); Michelman, supra note 26, at 25.
72.

383 U.S. 663 (1966).

73. Michelman, supra note 26, at 24-25; cf. Comment, Feeding the Hungry, 5 HARv.
Civ. RiGTrrs-CIV. LiB. Rav. 440, 457 (1970).
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protection," that is, where a fundamental personal interest is infringed
upon because of inequalities of wealth the state has an affirmative duty
to relieve that inequality in order to protect the interest. 74 Reference
to the model we have proposed shows that we are not arguing minimum
protection although it may be present. Minimum protection is triggered
by economic hazards whereas the state's affirmative duties in our model
are triggered by the involuntary taking of the individual's liberty. Common to both, however, is the notion that in order to be able to participate in society certain state services must not be denied.7 5 If the state's
services are necessary in order to participate in society then an even
greater duty should be on the state when it voluntarily takes the individual in order to provide those services.76
Education-A FundamentalPersonalInterest-Affirmative State Duties
Education as a fundamental personal interest has an erratic history.77
The strongest statement of its fundamental importance was made by
Chief Justice Warren in Brown v. Board of Education:7 8
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition
of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,
even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good
citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional
training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably
be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education. Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken
to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.79
Lower courts adopted the reasoning of Brown, but failed to hold that
74. Michelman, supra note 26.
75. Goodpaster, supra note 27, at 225.
76. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
77. See Coons, Clune and Sugarman, Educational Opportunity: A Workable Constitutional Test for State FinancialStructures, 57 CAIF. L. REv. 305, 373-83 (1969).
78. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
79. Id. at 493. It has been suggested that the Court's reliance on Brown in other desegregation cases, e.g., Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (per curiam)
(parks), leads to the conclusion that the Court in Brown was concerned more with race
than with education. Therefore, Brown is weak authority for the proposition that education is a fundamental personal interest. See Coons, Clune and Sugarman, supra note 79, at
380-81; Development, supra note 17, at 1089-90.
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education was a fundamental interest.80 In Serrano v. Priest,81 however,
the California Supreme Court, in invalidating that state's public school
financing system which was substantially based on local property taxes,
held that education was a fundamental interest.8 2 Recognizing the lack
of direct authority for this proposition, the court examined the role of
education in our modern industrial society. The court said that education was indispensable in that it affected both the individual and society. Education was found to affect the individual's chances for economic
and social success, and his development as an active political citizen. In
comparing education to voting, which has been deemed a fundamental
interest since other basic rights are founded upon it,' the court emphasized that both are crucial to the functioning of a democracy. Convinced that the uniqueness of education compelled treating it as a fundamental interest, the court summarized the arguments to support its
conclusion: despite a disadvantaged background education can give the
individual an opportunity to participate in free enterprise; education
is relevant to every individual for a long time; education molds the
personality of the recipient; and finally, education is so essential, states
84
make attendance compulsory.
Serrano's significance, however, lies beyond the court's holding. It is
submitted that Serrano can be read as saying that when the state involuntarily takes the child's liberty, by compelling him to attend school
in order for the state to protect and develop the interest of education,
the state must give something in return. California was forced to reorganize its educational financing scheme so that a child's education
would not depend on the wealth of his parents and neighbors. More
importantly, the state must strive for quality education for all of its
citizens-"the right to an education means more than access to the
classroom."8' 5 Relying on Reynolds v. Sims,"" the court stated: "If a
80. E.g., Hargrave v. McKinney, 413 F.2d 320, 324 (5th Cir. 1969) (referring to education as an interest that may be fundamental); Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,
496-97, 507 (D. D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(referring to education as a "critical right").
81. 5 Cal. 3d 584, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971).
82. California's system of financing public education was not the first state system to
come under attack. For an analysis of other state's decisions on public education financing
schemes similar to the one in Serrano and a discussion on whether the United States

Supreme Court will accept the Serrano view see Shanks, EducationalFinancing and Equal
Protection: Will the California Supreme Court's Breakthrough Become the Law of the
Land, 1 J. LAw & ED. 73 (1972).
83. 5 Cal. 3d at 608, 487 P.2d at 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618 citing Reynolds v. Sims,
377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
84. 5 Cal. 3d at 609-10, 487 P.2d at 1258-59, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 618-19.
85. Id. at 607, 487 P.2d at 1257, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 617.
86. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
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voter's address may not determine the weight to which his ballot is
entitled, surely it should not determine the quality of his child's education."87 The duties imposed on the state in return for compelling
the child to give up his freedom can also be drawn from prior education cases.
In compulsory education as in involuntary civil commitment8 8 the
state's authority to take the individual's liberty is based on two theories: parens patriae and police power.8 9 The state in exercising its police power takes it upon itself to provide the education the parent may
be unable to provide for the child.90 In upholding compulsory education laws, courts have recognized that only the state is in a position to
assure adequate education. 91 Generally, the state has complete control
over the education of children. Early cases upheld the right of the
parent to select courses for his child. 92 Today, however, courts will
uphold the state's authority to supervise education unless the parents
can show an infringement of some constitutional right. 93 Some courts
have gone beyond prohibiting what the state may do in educating children and have held that the state has certain affirmative duties in educating the young.9 Courts requiring these affirmative duties, explicitly
or inferentially, rely in part on the state's involuntary taking of the
child's liberty.
Following Brown, the question arose whether the state had an affirmative duty to alleviate racial imbalance in schools where the imbalance
was not a result of racially motivated state action. 95 Many courts read
Brown as merely requiring that a state discontinue support for segregated schools.9 6 Other courts, however, have interpreted Brown as em5 Cal. 3d at 613, 487 P.2d at 1262, 96 Cal. Rptr. at 622.
Supra note 60.
Parr v. State, 117 Ohio St. 23, 26, 157 N.E. 555, 556 (1927).
Compulsory attendance legislation is in effect in all fifty states. N. EDWARDS, THE
COURTS AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS 519 (1955). The state can compel school attendance, but
cannot compel public school attendance for those who choose to go to adequate private
schools. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
91. Commonwealth ex rel. School District of Pittsburgh v. Bey, 166 Pa. Super. 136, 140,
70 A.2d 693, 695 (1950).
92. E.g., State ex rel. Sheibley v. School Dist. No. I, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W. 393 (1891).
93. E.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (statute requiring that
passages from the Bible be read at the beginning of each school day, held unconstitutional);
West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag staute and
pledge of allegiance held unconstitutional).
94. See generally Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, Forward: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1966).
95.. See Rousselot, Achieving Equal Educational Opportunity for Negroes in the Public
Schools of the North and West: The Emerging Role for Private ConstitutionalLitigation,
35 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 698 (1967); Developments supra note 17, at 1183-87.
96. E.g., Bell v. School City, 213 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ind.) affd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.
87.
88.
89.
90.
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97
phasizing the inherent inequality of segregated schools and have therefore, felt compelled to require affirmative action by the state to relieve

the detrimental effects 98 of segregation. In Barksdale v. Springfield

School Committee,99 the court found the schools to be racially imbalanced due to a non-discriminatory districting plan. In ordering compulsory integration the court emphasized the state's affirmative duty
when it compels attendance at school: "Education is tax supported and
compulsory, and public school educators, therefore, must deal with inadequacies within the educational system as they arise ....

It has been suggested that since the state compels the child to participate in its educational system, it also has an affirmative duty to
eradicate the unequal achievement of students from disadvantaged
backgrounds by providing compensatory education.' 0 ' Compensatory
education programs require unequal spending in order to achieve equal
results. 02 Their purpose is to help the socially disadvantaged student
without adversely affecting the student who is progressing nor ma lly1 .
In Hobson v. Hansen,1' 4 the District of Columbia school system was
carefully examined. The court found that the system adversely affected
"disadvantaged minorities." As part of its ordered remedy, the court
directed the school district to implement a compensatory education
0 5 It is subprogram to overcome the effects of segregated education.
mitted that although the court did not say the state's affirmative duties
1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 139 F. Supp. 468 (D. Kan.
1955).
97. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954), where the Court said that,
"Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal."
98. See McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). In McLaurin, a
Negro admitted to graduate school, although permitted to use all facilities was segregated
from the whites. The Court, in holding the plan unconstitutional, said that the "restrictions impair and inhibit his ability to study, . . . and, in general, to learn his profession." Id. at 641.
99. 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass.), vacated and remanded with direction to dismiss without
prejudice, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965).
100. 237 F. Supp. at 546. Accord, Blocker v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 208, 227 (E.D.
N.Y. 1964), where the court said: "In a publicly supported, mandatory state educational
system, the plaintiffs have the civil right not to be segregated, not to be compelled to
attend a school in which all of the Negro children are educated separate and apart from
over 99% of their white contemporaries."
101. Horowitz, Unseparate But Unequal-The Emerging Fourteenth Amendment Issue
in Public School Education, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1147, 1167, 1170-71 (1966).
102. COMM. ON RACE AND EDUCATION, RACE AND EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN
PORTLAND'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 187 (1964). See generally Developments, supra note 17, at
1187-89.
103.

BLOOM,

DAVIS AND

HESS, COMPENSATORY

EDUCATION

FOR CULTURAL

DEPRIVATION

6 (1965).
104. 269 F. Supp. 401 (D. D.C. 1967), aff'd sub nom., Smuck v. Hobson, 408 F.2d 175
(D.C. Cir. 1969).
105. 269 F. Supp. at 515. See generally Comment, Hobson v. Hansen, Judicial Supervisor of the Color Blind School Board, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1511 (1968).
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were based on its compelling children to attend school, it was not necessary to do so. The entire problem arose in the context of compulsory
education. The court was concerned with the evils caused by social
disparity. One of the remedies to cure these defects was compensatory
education. However, without compulsory education such a remedy
would make absolutely no sense. It is only because there is compulsory
education that a compensatory education program can be used as a
vehicle to achieve the desired end-social and educational equality.
Parents have successfully argued that their children should not be
compelled to go to inferior schools. In In re Skipwith,'06 Negro parents
refused to send their children to racially segregated schools with inferior
teacher staffing. The parents were cited as respondents by the New
York City Board of Education for violating the compulsory attendance
laws. The court held that the parents had a constitutional right to
elect no education for their children rather than to subject them to
discriminatory inferior education. The necessary implication of this
decision is that if the state is to compel attendance at school, it must
provide more than inferior education in order to justify the depriva10 7
tion of liberty.
The taking of the child's liberty by compelling him to attend school
has also been used to justify the state's tort liability. In Jackson v.
Hankinson,08 the plaintiff's son was injured by a fellow student while
on a board of education bus. In holding that the board of education
could be liable for the injury for failure to exercise "reasonable supervisory care" the court said:
It must be borne in mind that the relationship between the child
and the school authorities is not a voluntary one but is compelled
by law. The child must attend school . . . and is subject to school
rules and disciplines. In turn the school authorities are obligated
9
to take reasonable precautions for his safety and well-being. 0
State recognition of some responsibility when it compels children to
attend school adds support to the judicial recognition of affirmative
duties. Providing books, 11 0 clothing,"' and transportation 1 2 for those
106.
wealth,
107.
108.
109.
1967).
110.
111.
112.

14 Misc. 2d 325, 180 N.Y.S.2d 852 (Dom. Rel. Ct. 1958); see Dobbins v. Common198 Va. 697, 96 S.E.2d 154 (1957).
Compare Birnbaum, supra note 9.
51 N.J. 230, 238 A.2d 685 (1968).
Id. at 236, 238 A.2d at 688. Contra, Wood v. Bd. of Educ., 412 S.W.2d 877 (Ky.
E.g., ButNss' IND. STAT. ANN. § 28-5314 (1970).
Id.
E.g., N.J.S.A. tit. 18a, § 39-1 (1968).
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who might be unable to comply with the compulsory attendance laws
without such aid is consistent with the state's position toward education.
Courts in stating that the primary purpose of compulsory education
is to secure attendance of the children at school, have recognized the
state's authority to make attendance possible." 3 In Chance v. Mississippi
State Textbook Rating and PurchasingBoard,"4 free school books were
provided for pupils in all elementary schools. In rejecting the argument
that providing free books for students in parochial schools violated the
establishment clause of the first amendment, the court stated: "If the
pupil may fulfil its duty to the state by attending a parochial school
it is difficult to see why the state may not fulfil its duty to the pupil
by encouraging it 'by all suitable means.' ""s Similarly, in Everson v.
Board of Education,116 the Supreme Court upheld a statute authorizing
the school boards to provide transportation to and from parochial and
other private schools as well as public schools. In rejecting the establishment of religion argument, the Court reasoned that transportation
to private schools aided those compelled to attend and not the school
attended.
Treatment-A Fundamental Personal InterestAffirmative State Duties
In order to understand what the developments in education mean
to treatment for the mentally ill, we must refer to the proposed model.
If education is a fundamental personal interest then treatment for the
mentally ill is no less than a fundamental personal interest. Treatment
for the mentally ill is also unique, in that it affects both the individual
and society. For the mentally ill, treatment affords an opportunity to
re-enter society as a normal productive individual; treatment is relevant to all those who are committed; treatment may continue over a
lengthy period of time; and, treatment works against the stigma of institutionalization in a mental hospital. Society profits from the indi113. See, e.g., State ex rel. School City v. Union Civil Twp., 222 Ind. 267, 53 N.E.2d
159 (1944).
114. 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1941).
115. Id. at 468, 200 So. at 710. In Johnson v. New York State Educ. Dep't., 449 F.2d 871
(1971) cert. granted, 40 U.S.L.W. 3398 (U.S. Feb. 27, 1972) (No. 5685). The Court upheld
a statute which provided state financial aid to local school districts to buy books to be
loaned free to students in grades 7-12, but not for grades 1-6. The court noted but obviously rejected the amicus brief's argument: "That whenever the State undertakes to
provide an education, there is a duty to provide free textbooks." 449 F.2d at 878.
116. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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vidual's development as an active citizen. Although possibly an oversimplification, an individual must have a mind free of mental disorder
to vote intelligently, to be educated or to profit from any education
received.117 As in education, the state's interest in treating the mentally
ill is evidenced by compulsory commitment statutes. Although no court
has specifically recognized treatment for the mentally ill as a fundamental interest, certain intimations do exist. In Wyatt v. Stickney, 118
the court stated that the "purpose of involuntary hospitalization for
treatment purposes is treatment and not mere custodial care or punishment."' 119 Each patient must receive treatment that will enable him
to be cured or to improve his mental condition. 20 It is not important
whether treatment for the mentally ill has been recognized as a fundamental interest; it is only important that treatment for the mentally
ill deserves such recognition.' 2 '
Treatment for the mentally ill is, or should be, a fundamental personal interest. By involuntarily taking the individual's liberty, the state
must in return, provide adequate treatment. In mental health, as in
education, courts in requiring affirmative duties have relied in part on
the state's involuntary taking of the individual's liberty. In Department
of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner,122 the California Supreme Court invalidated, as a denial of equal protection, a statute imposing liability
upon one person for the support of another in a state institution. The
Department of Mental Health was precluded from recovering the cost
of the care and maintenance of a mother in a state mental institution
from the estate of the mother's daughter. The court reasoned that the
purpose of the involuntary confinement was to protect society, and
possibly to rehabilitate the individual. Therefore, the state had to bear
"the cost of maintaining the state institution, including provision for
adequate care for its inmates ....

,,..3 This represents one judicial rec-

ognition of an affirmative state duty in return for the involuntary taking of the individual's liberty-it is not a recognition of a constitutional
right to treatment.
117. Cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Goodpaster, supra note 27, at 253.
118. 325 F. Supp. 781 (1971).
119. Id. at 784.
120. See Dept. of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal.
Rptr. 488 (1964). In Kirchner, the court said that the purpose of treatment for the civilly
committed encompasses the individual's "possible reclamation as a productive member
of the body politic." Id. at 718, 388 P.2d at 722, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 490. Compare, text supra
page 642, in reference to Serrano.
121. Cf. Coons, Clune and Sugarman, supra note 77, at 382.
122. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964).
123. Id. at 718, 388 P.2d at 722, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
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CONCLUSION

The right to counsel and the right to education are susceptible of
a common analysis. This analysis demonstrates that once a fundamental
personal interest is interfered with by state action the judiciary has responded with the creation of affirmative state duties to protect and
promote the interest. If the right to an education means more than
access to a classroom, then care for the mentally ill must mean more
than custodial confinement. If the right to counsel means the right to
effective representation, then treatment must mean something more
than one doctor to every thousand patients. Society has not tolerated
blatant violations of fundamental personal interests in education and
right to counsel-how can we do so for the mentally ill?
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